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"The Right to Bear Arms": Two Views 
"If one considers the three 
most critical modes of inter­
pretation of the Second 
Amendment - its 
language, its history and 
the intent of its founders, 
and its consistent inter­
pretation by the courts - it 
is quite evident that the Se­
cond Amendment does not 
guarantee an individual's 
right to bear arms." 
By LEE FISHER 
Attorney General, 
State of Ohio 
As Ohio's attorney general, I am frequently called upon 
to address certain controversial issues from both subjective 
policy and formal legal viewpoints. As the state's chief law 
enforcement officer, I have a vested interest in effective 
crime control measures. 
Handgun control and, more specifically, the interpreta­
tion of the Second Amendment with regard to an in­
dividual's right to bear arms is certainly an area where my 
statutory legal responsibility and policy agenda merge. 
From a policy perspective, I support the right of law-abiding 
citizens to own a gun. 
However, with regard to the interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, I firmly believe that there are few constitu­
tional questions with such a clear-cut, definitive answer. If 
one considers the three most critical modes of interpreta­
tion of the Second Amendment - its language, its history 
and the intent of its founders, and its consistent interpreta­
tion by the courts - it is quite evident that the Second 
Amendment does not guarantee an individual's right to bear 
"The Bill of Rights was 
adopted to protect in­
dividual rights. The Second 
Amendment is no exception. 
It guarantees the in­
dividual right to keep and 
bear arms . .. The Supreme 
Court's rulings have always 
been consistent with this in­
tent and this interpretation 
" 
By DAVID C. TRYON 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur 
The Bill of Rights was adopted to protect individual 
rights. The Second Amendment is no exception. It 
guarantees the individual right to keep and bear arms. 
The framers considered this a pre-existing fundamental 
right, essential to our freedom. The Supreme Court's rul­
ings have always been consistent with this intent and this 
interpretation. Unfortunately, some lower courts and the 
media have chosen to ignore both the intent of the framers 
and the Supreme Court's rulings and have claimed it 
preserves only some nebulous "collective" right belonging 
to everyone, but no one. 
The right to bear arms has its roots in 12th century 
England. At that time all freemen not only had the right 
but also had the duty to own and possess arms. However, 
as with all other "rights" given to subjects of a monarchy, 
this right was periodically taken away and restored, depen­
ding on the disposition of the king. 
Whatever the status of the right in England, the colonies 
clearly considered the right to bear arms an inalienable in-
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arms. 
The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 
Most Americans are familiar with only part of its 
language, the abridged version emblazoned on the edifice 
of the National Rifle Association's Washington, D.C., head­
quarters: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed." The conspicuous omission of the first 
13 words of the amendment - the most important 13 con­
textually - speaks volumes. 
It is precisely that language that expresses the purpose 
and the limit of the right to keep and bear arms. This right 
exists solely in its relation to the maintenance of a well 
regulated militia and is not a constitutional safeguard of an 
individual's right to keep and bear arms. 
• 
A review of the historical context which led the framers 
of the Bill of Rights to adopt the Second Amendment in its 
present form provides compelling evidence regarding their 
intent. 
Certain events that preceded the Revolutionary War ­
namely the indiscriminate use of British troops by King 
George III to collect taxes and "maintain order" in the col­
onies - left the colonists with a strong aversion to stan­
ding armies. Instead, they favored state militias, compos­
ed of ordinary citizens who would presumably be more 
responsive to the will of the people. 
When the new Constitution was submitted to the states 
for ratification, the battle lines were drawn between the 
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists - the latter believ­
ing that a bill of rights was necessary to properly restrain 
the power of the central government. 
The Second Amendment specifically addressed concerns 
articulated by individuals like George Mason at the Virginia 
ratification convention: 
"The militia may here be destroyed by that method 
which has been practiced in other parts of the world 
before; that is, by rendering them useless - by dis­
arming them. Under various pretences, Congress may 
neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the 
militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for 
Congress has an exclusive right to arm them ..." 3 
J. Elliot, "The Debates in the Several State Conven­
tions of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution" (2d 
ed. 1836, at 379 [hereinafter cited as "Elliot's 
Debates"]. 
The Anti-Federalist concern, therefore, was that Con­
gress might allow the state militias to die simply by failing 
to arm them. 
The Virginia Convention proposed 20 amendments to the 
text of the Constitution, including that "each state respec­
tively shairhave the power to provide for organizing, arm­
ing and disciplining its own militias, wheresoever Congress 
shall omit or neglect to provide for the same." "Elliot's 
Debates," supra, at 663. There is no suggestion in the 
Virginia debates that the delegates were concerned with 
an individual's right to possess weapons outside the militia 
context. 
In order to avoid a new Constitutional Convention that 
might reconsider the entire document, Federalist James 
Madison drafted a bill of rights for presentation at the First 
Congress. His draft of the provision that became the Se­
cond Amendment read: 
"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall 
not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated 
militia being the best security of a free country; but 
no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall 
be compelled to render military service in person." 
E. Dumbauld, "The Bill of Rights and What It Means 
Today," 207 (1957) [hereinafter cited as "Dumbauld"). 
Thus, the "right to keep and bear arms" was introduced 
into the language of the proposed amendment (it had been 
omitted from the Virginia Convention proposal) but only as 
part of a provision dealing with military matters. 
There is no indication from the history of the Second 
Amendment that the founders were seeking a broad 
guarantee of the individual right to own firearms for any 
purpose. On the contrary, the expressed intention of the 
framers was to guarantee that state militias remained arm­
ed and viable, and the "right to keep and bear arms" must 
be understood as implementing that purpose. 
The implication of this intention is that constitutionality 
of a statute regulating firearms should turn on whether the 
statute affects firearms in such a way as to adversely af­
fect a state's ability to raise and maintain an armed "well 
regulated militia." 
• 
The judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment has 
consistently reinforced this view of the framers' intent and 
the context in which the language was drafted. 
With the exception of one 1902 ruling of the Idaho 
Supreme Court, In re Brickey, 70 P. 609 (1902), the courts 
have been unanimous in refusing to apply the Second 
Amendment to state regulation of firearms. 
See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 
270 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Applica­
tion of Atkinson, 291N.W.2d996, 398 n.1 (Minn.1980); State 
v. Amos, 343 So.2d 166, 168 (La. 1977); Commonwealth v. 
Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1976); Cases v. United 
States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 
U.S. 770 (1943). 
In United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), the 
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Supreme Court directly addressed the scope of the Second 
Amendment and its impact on federal gun laws. The issue 
was whether the National Firearms Act of 1934 violated the 
Second Amendment insofar as the statute barred the in­
terstate transportation of an unregistered shotgun having 
a barrel length of less than 18 inches. 
As noted previously, the court held that the amendment 
must be applied in light of its "obvious purpose" to assure 
the continuation of state militias. Miller at 178. The court 
upheld the statute because no showing had been made that 
private ownership of sawed-off shotguns had any relation 
to preservation of a well regulated militia. Miller, at 178. 
Miller, however, is not the Supreme Court's last word on 
the subject. 
In Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), the court 
upheld the federal statute barring convicted felons from 
possessing firearms against equal protection attack. 
Significantly, the court determined that the statute need­
ed only a "rational basis" to survive constitutional attack 
because "[t]hese legislative restrictions on the use of 
firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect 
criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally pro­
tected liberties." Lewis, at 65, n. 8 (emphasis added). Miller 
is cited in support of this proposition. 
Following Miller's direction that a firearms statute is un­
constitutional only if it adversely affects a state's ability 
to maintain a militia, the lower federal courts consistently 
have upheld laws regulating the private ownership of 
firearms. These cases reject the existence of a broad right 
to bear arms for purposes other than in a state militia. 
See, e.g., Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3d 
Cir. 1973) ("... the right to keep and bear arms is not a right 
given by the United States Constitution"); United States 
v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (statute barr­
ing felons from transporting firearms in interstate com­
merce is constitutional because there is no evidence that 
it " .. .in any way affects the maintenance of a well regulated 
militia"). 
Of the modern federal court decisions, the most far­
reaching is the Seventh Circuit's in Morton Grove in which 
the court upheld a local ban on the possession of handguns 
against a Second Amendment challenge, not only because 
the amendment does not apply to the state but also because 
"... the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the 
preservation of a militia ... the right to keep and bear han­
dguns is not guaranteed by the second amendment." Mor­
ton Grove, at 270. 
• 
I am sure the debate about how best to keep guns out 
of the hands of criminals will continue for many years to 
come. 
But those who rely on the Second Amendment as justifica­
tion for an individual's right to bear arms are misconstru­
ing the language, the intent of the framers, and judicial 
precedent regarding this amendment. • 
Author's Note: Portions of this article were borrowed 
from "The Second Amendment: What It Really Means" by 
Sarah Brady and "The Right To Be Armed: A Constitutional 
Illusion" by Dennis A. Hengan with their permission. 
TRYON ... 
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dividual right. (In fact, it was more firmly entrenched as 
a civil right than the right of free speech, which was fre­
quently severely restricted if it did not comport with the 
majority opinion.) 
As early as 1632, the Plymouth Colony not only allowed 
but required the inhabitants to each own a musket and am­
munition therefor. In 1677, it required them to own the much 
more modern and effective flintlocks (while the English Ar­
my was still using the older matchlocks). 
Other colonies had similar la\VS. In fact, in 1644, 
Massachusetts passed a law actually fining those who were 
not armed! 
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, gun ownership 
and public carrying of firearms was a commonly accepted 
practice, even in the established cities which were no longer 
threatened by Indians and wild animals. 
In fact, when British Government troops landed in the 
New England city of Boston, its citizens were enraged and 
proceeded to arm themselves to defend their liberties and 
properties from the soldiers. When some loyalists objected, 
other citizens pointed out that this was nothing more than 
an exercise of their rights as British subjects pursuant to 
the British Declaration of Rights. 
Subsequently, in 177 4 and 1775, the British conducted 
several raids on colony militia arsenals. These attempts to 
disarm American citizens were one of the causes of the 
American Revolution. Finally, one such raid resulted in a 
skirmish killing several colonists and many British soldiers 
- and thus began the American Revolution. 
• 
After the Revolution, when several states began to 
discuss the Constitution, the framers rejected the British 
concept that British subjects had the rights which the parlia-
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ment and the king gave them. Under the Constitution, the 
people had "inalienable rights" and the government had only 
the powers which the people gave it in the Constitution. 
One of the reasons the Constitution was so controversial 
was because the states distrusted central governments sup­
ported by standing armies and select militias (such as the 
modern day National Guard). Therefore, they gave the 
government very limited powers for such military groups 
in the Constitution. 
However, this was not enough for some who demanded 
a Bill of Rights containing guarantees of individual rights, 
including the right to bear arms, such as that contained in 
the English Declaration of Rights. This would prevent 
governmental oppression of the people and prevent the 
government from taking away other rights. 
When New Hampshire cast the last vote adopting the 
Constitution in 1789, it included a recommendation for a Bill 
of Rights with this provision: "Congress shall never disarm 
any citizen unless such as are or have been in actual 
rebellion." 
(Most states had already adopted their own Bill of Rights, 
the majority of which included the right to keep and bear 
arms. Pennsylvania's was the first, and it included "the right 
of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and 
the State ..." Ohio adopted the same provision in 1803.) 
This view - that individuals had the right to bear arms, 
and that their bearing those arms was good for the coun­
try - seems to have been universal among the members 
of the First Continental Congress and other early patriots: 
• Richard Henry Lee: "To preserve liberty, it is essen­
tial that the whole body of the people always possess arms." 
• Patrick Henry: "The great object is that every man be 
armed." 
• Tench Cox (a prominent Federalist): "Implements of war 
are the 'birthright of an American' ..." 
•Thomas Jefferson: "No free man shall ever be debarred 
the use of arms." 
• Alexander Hamilton: "The best we can hope for con­
cerning the people at large is that they be properly armed." 
•George Washington: "[Firearms are] next in importance 
to the Constitution itself," they are the "American people's 
liberty teeth" and "they deserve a place of honor with all 
that's good." 
• William Blackstone Oegal commentator): "The right of 
having and using arms for self-preservation and defense" 
is a "liberty of Englishmen " (1803 commentary). 
Indeed, none of them ever asserted the idea that the 
states or the military, rather than individual citizens, have 
the "right" to be armed. 
• 
Congress reconvened to prepare a Bill of Rights, Madison 
prepared the initial draft of the Bill of Rights. His intent 
of its meaning was evidenced by his statement that 
"Americans have the right and advantage of being armed 
- unlike the citizens of other countries whose governments 
are afraid to trust the people with arms." While some 
amendments were heavily debated and others removed en­
tirely, there was very little controversy on this amendment. 
The two main debates on the wording were, first, to limit 
the right to use "for the common defense." This was re­
jected, indicating the right was personal and did not apply 
only to a select militia repulsing a foreign invader. 
Second, there was a debate as to whether to include a 
clause preventing the government from forcing conscien­
tious objectors to bear arms. That provision was also re­
jected. 
(Consequently, the Second Congress enacted the Militia 
Act of 1792 which defined the Militia as all able-bodied free 
males, and required them to own firearms and ammunition 
to be used if they were called into action.) 
As adopted, the Second Amendment consists of two con­
cepts. First, the framers recognized that "A well regulated 
Militia" is "necessary to the security of a free State," and, 
without that, the state would not long remain secure or free. 
The militia referred to therein was not a select militia (such 
as the modern-day National Guard) but rather all able-bodied 
freemen who were to supply their own weapons. 
Thus, the second element consisted of a guarantee of the 
right to keep and bear arms to at least all who constitute 
such a militia. In fact, it went further than the Fourth 
Amendment (which allows reasonable searches) and pro­
hibited any infringement on the right to keep and bear arms. 
But if a state fails to maintain a well regulated militia, 
that does not destroy the right; it only means that the securi­
ty of that state may be in jeopardy. The right which was 
guaranteed and which "shall not be infringed" is the right 
of the people (not the state or a select militia) to "keep and 
bear arms." If it is infringed, a well regulated militia can­
not be maintained and the security of the free state may 
be in danger. 
• 
The early judicial discussions of the right to bear arms 
are consistent with the intent behind the Second 
Amendment. 
• Kentucky's high court voided a concealed weapon 
statute as conflicting with Kentucky's Bill of Rights provi­
sion "that the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense 
of themselves and the state shall not be questioned." Bliss 
v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822). 
• The Louisiana high court stated that the "right to carry 
arms ... is a right guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States ..."State v. Chandler, 5 La. App. 489, 52 
Am. Dec. 599 (1850). 
• The Alabama Supreme Court determined that the 
Alabama Constitution protected the individual's "right to 
bear arms in defense of himself and the state" but allowed 
the Legislature to regulate "the manner in which arms shall 
be borne." State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840). 
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• In 1846, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized the 
right to bear arms as a fundamental inalienable right. While 
it recognized that the U.S. Bill of Rights did not restrict 
state action (Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)), it 
struck down a handgun ban based on that right, which it 
determined existed with or without the U.S. Constitution. 
Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
Thus, the earliest interpretations considered it an in­
dividual right. 
The first U.S. Supreme Court comment on the Second 
Amendment was in 1857. The court clearly stated (albeit 
in dicta) that individual citizens had the right to "keep and 
carry arms wherever they went." Dred Scott v. Sanford, 
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
The first Supreme Court case actually ruling on the Sec­
ond Amendment was U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
The court stated that the First and Second Amendments 
restricted only federal action; but those rights were not 
created by the Bill of Rights but existed prior to the 
adoption thereof: 
"The right there [Second Amendment] specified is that 
of 'bearing arms for lawful purpose'. This is not a right 
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any man­
ner dependent upon that instrument for its existence." 
92 U.S. at 553. 
This case was followed in 1886 by a criminal prosecution 
of a group of civilians 'parading with arms' as a military com­
pany. (Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).) The 14th 
Amendment still hadn't been interpreted to extend the Bill 
of Rights to state action, and therefore the court found the · 
state law did not conflict with the Second Amendment. In 
dicta the court made clear its views as to the meaning of 
the Second Amendment: 
"It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of 
bearing arms constitute the reserve military force or 
reserve militia of the United States as well as of the 
states; and ... [therefore] the states cannot, even lay­
ing the constitutional provision in question out of view, 
prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, 
so as to deprive the United States of their rightful 
resource while maintaining the public security, and 
disable the people from performing their duty to the 
general government." (Emphasis added.) 116 U.S. at 
265. 
Eight years later, the court suggested that the 14th 
Amendment might make the Second Amendment applicable 
to state action but declined to so hold since the defendant 
had failed to raise that issue in the trial court. Miller v. 
Texas, 153 U.S. 536 (1894). (It wasn't until 1897 that the court 
determined that the 14th Amendment applies certain 
aspects of the Bill of Rights to state action. Since then, the 
court hasn't reviewed any cases involving state action infr­
inging on the right to bear arms.) 
Then, in 1939, the court faced the meaning of the Second 
Amendment squarely and formulated a test. Jack Miller was 
convicted for violation of the National Firearms Act (thus 
the 14th Amendment was not involved) by virtue of his 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The court stated: 
"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that 
possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel less 
than 18 inches in length' at this time has some 
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficien­
cy of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the 
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and 
bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within 
judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the or­
dinary military equipment or that its use could con­
tribute to the common defense. Aymett v. State, 2 
Humph.154, 158." U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S.174at178. 
Thus, if a "weapon" is a "militia arm," the Second Amend­
ment guarantees individuals the right to keep and bear such 
weapon. (Note that Aymett stood for the proposition that 
individual citizens could possess ordinary military weapons.) 
Had the court believed this to be a collective right rather 
than an individual one, it would have ignored the issue of 
the militia usage of the firearms and would have simply 
stated that Miller had no right to own any gun. 
• 
To this point, the federal courts had followed the clear 
intent of the framers. However, some lower courts soon 
began to rebel from the original intent and from the holdings 
of the Supreme Court. 
In 1942, the First Circuit interpreted Miller to mean that 
the Second Amendment guarantees individuals the right 
to bear any 'arms' which can be used by a militia. The court 
then refused to follow the Supreme Court's test (and so 
stated) because of the broad range of 'arms' that would be 
included. Instead, the court required that the 'arms' be in 
actual use by a militia to gain Second Amendment protec­
tion. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, cert. den. 319 
U.S. 770 (1st Cir. 1942), rehearing den. 324 U.S. 889 (1945). 
In the same year, the Third Circuit invented the "collec­
tivist" theory. U.S. v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942) rev'd 
on other grounds 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The court held that 
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the right to bear arms is not absolute and therefore felons, 
maniacs, and children could be prohibited from possession 
of firearms. While it is true that no rights are absolute, the 
court then made a monumental leap in logic, misquoted 
Miller, and declared (in dicta and without much analysis) 
that the Second Amendment did not protect individual 
rights, only states' rights to maintain a militia organization. 
The court also adopted the requirement from Miller that 
the 'arms' protected must be related to a 'well regulated 
militia.' 
Thus, one circuit recognized the Miller test but refused 
to follow it, and another mischaracterized it and created its 
own law. 
Since then, most circuit courts facing the issue (usually 
in connection with a convicted felon owning a firearm and 
represented by inadequate legal counsel, if any) have con­
tinued to ignore the Miller test and adopted the Tot dicta, 
holding the Second Amendment inapplicable to individuals. 
Some courts and commentators have suggested that this 
interpretation is mandated by the clause "the right of the 
people," claiming that "people" means the states. However, 
the Supreme Court specifically stated in U.S. v. Verdugo­
Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1839 494 (1990), that "people," 
as used in the Second Amendment, means individual 
citizens. (Note also that when the framers meant to protect 
states rights, they used the word "states"; to protect in­
dividual rights they used the word "people.'' See Amend­
ment X.) 
Others have suggested that the Second Amendment ap­
plies only to states because of the initial reference to the 
militia. They argue that the militia is the National Guard, 
and the Second Amendment only guarantees to the states 
the right to arm the National Guard. 
However, the Supreme Court made it clear in Miller that 
the "militia" constitutes all male citizens, not just those 
enrolled in a branch of the military. More recently, the 
Supreme Court held that the National Guard is under the 
control of the Federal Government, not the states. Perpich 
v. Department of Defense, 110 S.Ct. 2418, 498 U.S. ___ 
(1990). 
Therefore; the National Guard is not in a position to fulfill 
the purpose of protecting the individual states either from 
federal or foreign aggression, especially when the federal 
government sends them abroad for training or combat. (Note 
also that the plaintiff governors in Perpich did not claim 
that the Second Amendment protected the states' interest 
in the National Guard.) 
This effectively overrules U.S. v. Tot and its progeny 
which claim that the Second Amendment protects state 
militia organizations from encroachment of federal power. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled against the underly­
ing arguments for the "collectivist" theory, leaving the "in­
dividual" interpretation and the Miller test intact. (Note that 
Lewis v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55, 65 Fn. 8 (1980), appears to en­
dorse the Miller test.) 
History makes clear that when the framers of the Bill of 
Rights referred to the militia in the Second Amendment 
they meant all able-bodied men. Congress (see 10 U.S.C. Sec. 
311) and the Supreme Court (see Presser, Miller, and Per­
pichl have continued to endorse that interpretation. While 
such a force might not be suitable for some military actions, 
it can be, and has been, used for its intended purpose ­
protection of the individual states from aggression, both 
foreign and domestic (such as during World War II, the Civil 
War, and the Spanish-American War). 
While the need for such a militia may not be obvious now, 
no one knows what the future may bring. The Bill of Rights 
is meant to protect rights for the future as well as the 
present. 
Nevertheless, similar modern-day usage does exist. Local 
groups banding together to protect their neighborhoods are 
essentially modern-day militias, and self-defense efforts also 
fall within that general concept. 
• 
In view of current Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 
what "gun control" laws would be constitutional? 
Clearly, the government can (and does) prevent felons, 
children, and mentally disabled individuals from possess­
ing firearms. The Supreme Court has upheld laws register­
ing owners of machine guns. Laws highly regulating posses­
sion of explosives and banning possession of bazookas, hand 
grenades, tanks, howitzers, etc., remain unchallenged and 
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are probably constitutional. 
However, laws banning semi-automatic firearms (carry­
ing the misnomer "assault weapons") clearly violate the 
Miller test. Morgan, "Assault Rifle Legislation: Unwise and 
Unconstitutional," 17 Am. J. of Crim. Law 143 (Winter 1990). 
Claims that these firearms are not used for hunting or spor­
ting purposes are irrelevant to the constitutional issues. 
Waiting periods, whether or not desirable, may well also 
be deficient (a waiting period on the exercise of a constitu­
tional right is invalid. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc­
tive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)). Thus, much of the current 
push for "gun control" may need to be refocused on "crime­
control." 
Like the Third Amendment and the Tenth Amendment, 
the importance of the Second Amendment is often disparag­
ed by some as having no modern-day relevance. However, 
87 percent of Americans believe, and most published law 
review articles argue, that the Second Amendment 
guarantees individuals the right to bear arms. ("Decision 
Making Information, Attitudes of the American Electorate 
Toward Gun Control" (1978)). The history of the Second 
Amendment and Supreme Court interpretations thereof 
support that belief. 
Those who argue that it gives no such right must now 
show how the "collectivist" interpretation squares with the 
recent Supreme Court holdings in U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez 
and Perpich v. Department of Defense. 
If society deems the Miller test too broad, or gun posses­
sion too dangerous for individuals, the issues should be given 
full debate in an attempt to revise or repeal the Second 
Amendment. Until then, the right to bear arms remains a 
viable, fundamental, and inalienable right guaranteed by the 
Constitution and relied upon by millions of Americans. 
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